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How	has	Brexit,	and	other	EU	crises,	affected	party
Euroscepticism	across	Europe?
Analysing	the	results	of	a	new	expert	survey,	Aleks	Szczerbiak	and	Paul	Taggart
write	that	Brexit	has	so	far	had	a	very	limited	impact	on	national	party	politics	across
Europe	beyond	the	UK,	particularly	compared	with	the	earlier	Eurozone	and	migration
crisis.	While	the	longer-term,	dynamic	effects	of	Brexit	on	party	Euroscepticism	might
be	greater	and	there	are	a	number	of	countries	to	watch	where	such	impacts	might
develop,	perceptions	of	its	‘success’	or	‘failure’	will	be	filtered	through	competing
narratives	and	questions	raised	about	whether	broader	lessons	can	be	drawn	from	the	British	case.
Denmark	is	the	country	most	‘to	watch’,	write	Szczerbiak	and	Taggart.	Photo:	A	Danish	People’s	Party	slogan	–	‘More	Denmark,
Less	EU’.	Credits:	News	Oresund	(CC	BY	2.0)
A	distant	and	abstract	process
In	2015	and	earlier	this	year	we	conducted	two	expert	surveys	in	which	we	examined	the	impact	the	Eurozone
crisis,	the	migration	crisis	and	Brexit	on	Euroscepticism	on	party	politics	across	Europe.	We	drew	on	expertise
from	the	University	of	Sussex-based	European	Parties	Elections	and	Referendums	Network	(EPERN)	to	gather
data	on	all	EU	member	states	together	with	Norway,	Serbia	and	Switzerland.	The	project	was	funded	by	the
ESRC’s	‘UK	in	a	Changing	Europe’	project.	(We	are	extremely	grateful	to	the	ESRC	and	all	of	our	respondents,
although	analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	comparative	findings	are	our	own).
Our	main	finding	is	that	there	has	been	a	clear	difference	between	the	impacts	of	the	different	crises.	The
Eurozone	crisis	had	a	particularly	powerful	effect,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	in	the	party	systems	of	those	countries
most	affected	by	the	bailout	packages:	Germany,	Greece	and	Ireland	(to	a	lesser	extent,	Slovakia,	Finland,
Spain,	Portugal).	The	migration	crisis	had	a	particularly	strong	effect	on	party	politics	in	the	post-communist
states	of	central	Europe	(Poland,	Hungary,	Slovakia,	Czech	Republic),	and	also	Bulgaria	–	but,	interestingly,	not
most	of	the	post-communist	Balkan	EU	members	(Croatia,	Romania,	Slovenia)	and	candidates	(Serbia),	nor	the
post-Soviet	Baltic	states.
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The	UK’s	June	2016	referendum	vote	to	leave	the	EU	has,	on	the	other	hand,	had	a	very	limited	impact	on
national	party	politics,	particularly	when	compared	with	these	two	earlier	EU	crises.	Its	main	effect	has	been	to	re-
inforce	and	legitimise	existing	what	we	term	‘Soft’	or	‘Hard’	Eurosceptic	narratives,	rather	than	lead	to	an	increase
in	Eurosceptic	party	politics	overall	or	shifts	from	Hard	to	Soft	Euroscepticism.	In	our	earlier	writings,	we	defined:
Hard	Euroscepticism	as	principled	opposition	to	the	project	of	European	integration	(based	on	the	ceding	or
transfer	of	powers	to	supranational	institutions	such	as	the	EU);	and	Soft	Euroscepticism	as	when	there	was	not	a
principled	objection	to	EU	European	integration	but	there	was	opposition	to	Union’s	current	or	future	planned
trajectory	(based	on	the	further	extension	of	competencies	that	it	was	planning	to	make).
Beyond	the	immediate	news	impact	of	the	actual	referendum	vote,	Brexit	has	hitherto	been	a	rather	distant	and
abstract	process,	with	little	apparent	popular	resonance	–	certainly	compared	with	the	two	earlier	crises	which,	in
some	countries	at	least,	appeared	to	have	a	powerful	public	salience	and	perceived	impact	upon	many	people’s
day-to-lives.	The	survey	was	conducted	before	Article	50	was	invoked	and	this	meant	that	EU	states	had	not
formally	reacted	to	Brexit.	However,	the	initial	nature	of	the	process,	even	after	Article	50,	would	seem	to	suggest
that	it	will	be	complicated,	elite-driven	and	multi-institutional.	For	this	reason,	the	process	may	continue	to	have
low	public	resonance	throughout	the	Brexit	negotiations;	except	in	Britain,	of	course,	where	it	is	dominating	and
over-shadowing	virtually	all	other	political	issues.
What	might	change	this	is	the	chance	that	particular	issues	which	have	a	public	salience	in	particular	countries
may	flare	up	in	the	course	of	the	negotiations,	such	as	the	post-Brexit	status	of	EU	citizens	currently	in	the	UK.
However,	it	is	also	possible	these	will	be	contested	as	so-called	‘valence’	issues	over	the	competence	(or	lack	of
it)	of	the	governing	party	that	is	conducting	the	negotiations.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	Brexit	might	decrease
as	well	as	increase	Euroscepticism,	especially	of	the	Hard	variety,	if	it	becomes	associated	with	too	much
economic,	political	and	social	uncertainty	and	dislocation.
Countries	to	watch
Within	this	overall	framework	there	are	a	number	of	countries	‘to	watch’	where	we	think	that	there	have	been
interesting	responses	to	the	Brexit	crisis	or	where	such	responses	might	develop,	particularly	when	the	impact	of
this	is	re-inforced	by	or	linked	to	the	two	earlier	crises:
France	(parliamentary	election	in	June	2017)	–	France	has	a	strong	Eurosceptic	party	on	the	radical	right
(the	National	Front)	and	some	smaller	(Soft	Eurosceptic)	ones	on	the	radical	left.	All	three	crises	have
provided	an	impetus	for	the	National	Front:	the	Eurozone	crisis	created	space	for	their	Euroscepticism	to
flourish;	the	migration	crisis	allowed	the	increased	focus	on	security	to	mesh	with	the	party’s	policy	on
border	control;	and	the	Brexit	crisis	allowed	it	argue	that	‘Frexit’	is	now	clearly	possible	and	galvanised	the
issue	of	a	referendum	on	EU	membership	for	the	party	(as	well	as	increasing	Soft	Euroscepticism	on	the
mainstream	right).	Eurosceptic	candidates	of	left	and	right	won	a	sizeable	share	of	the	vote	in	the	first	round
of	the	April/May	presidential	election	and	National	Front	leader	Marine	Le	Pen	secured	over	one-third	in	the
second	round	run-off;	although	there	was	also	evidence	that	she	rowed	back	from	emphasising
Euroscepticism	as	an	issue	as	the	campaign	progressed.
Ireland	(next	parliamentary	election	before	April	2021)	–	the	Eurozone	crisis	pushed	Euroscepticism	to	the
fore	of	the	Irish	party	system	and	transformed	the	salience	of	these	issues.	However,	interestingly,	Brexit
appears	to	have	dramatically	reduced	party-based	Euroscepticism	in	this	country	due	to:	economic
uncertainty,	the	opportunities	it	presents	for	Irish	‘reunification’	and	for	Ireland	to	act	as	a	bridge	between
the	UK	and	EU,	and	its	association	with	English	nationalism.
Denmark	(next	parliamentary	election	before	June	2019)	–	with	its	strong	tradition	of	Eurosceptic	public
opinion	and	single	issue	parties/movements,	and	a	propensity	for	EU	referendums,	Denmark	is	possibly	the
country	most	‘to	watch’	in	terms	of	parties	attempting	to	follow	the	Brexit	route.	Although	Brexit	and	the	two
other	crises	had	a	moderate	impact	on	party	Euroscepticism,	Denmark	has	a	strong	Eurosceptic	party	on
the	radical	right	(Danish	People’s	Party)	which	is	pushing	for	a	‘British	solution’	and	wants	a	referendum	to
leave	the	EU.	A	new	right-wing	Eurosceptic	party	(the	New	Civic	Party)	has	also	emerged	recently	which
appears	likely	to	enter	parliament	after	the	next	election	and	is	also	calling	for	an	EU	referendum	and	for	the
Union	to	be	re-focused	solely	on	to	free	trade.
Italy	(next	parliamentary	election	before	May	2018)	–	Italy	has	a	large,	radical	anti-establishment
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Eurosceptic	party	(the	Five	Star	Movement),	which	is	performing	strongly	in	opinion	polls,	and	another
medium-sized	radical	right	Eurosceptic	grouping	(Northern	League).	Party	Euroscepticism	in	Italy	was	given
much	greater	salience	and	opportunity	by	the	Eurozone	crisis,	and	sustained	by	the	migration	crisis,	where
the	EU	was	accused	even	by	mainstream	parties	of	abandoning	Italy.	The	Brexit	crisis	has	not,	however,
given	this	a	significant	boost.	Its	main	impact	appears	to	have	been	introducing	the	new	word	‘Italexit’	into
the	political	lexicon,	although	Eurosceptic	parties	refer	mainly	to	leaving	the	Eurozone	rather	than	the	EU
itself	when	they	discuss	this.
The	‘Visegrad	Four’	post-communist	Central	European	states	–	the	Czech	Republic	(next	parliamentary
election	before	October	2017),	Hungary	(before	spring	2018),	Slovakia	(before	March	2020),	and	Poland
(before	October	2019)	–	although	the	Eurozone	crisis	had	little	impact	on	party	politics	in	these	countries
(notwithstanding	helping	to	bring	down	a	Slovak	government	in	2011)	and	the	Brexit	referendum	simply	re-
affirmed	existing	Soft	Eurosceptic	narratives,	the	migration	crisis	did	lead	to	a	significant	re-framing	of	the
way	that	the	EU	is	debated	in	these	states,	leading	to	a	sharpening	of	Soft	Euroscepticism	among
mainstream	political	actors.	Interestingly,	this	phenomenon	has	not	really	affected	other	post-communist
states	such	as	the	Baltic	republics	(where	security	continues	to	trump	all	other	considerations)	and	(except
for	Bulgaria,	where	the	migration	issue	meshes	with	existing	tensions	with	the	Turkish	minority)	the	Balkan
states.	In	the	Western	Balkan	‘front	line’	states,	the	greater	concern	is	that	the	EU	manage	the	flows	and
burden	share	rather	than	oppose	compulsory	migrant	relocation	in	principle.
Austria	(next	parliamentary	election	before	October	2018)	–	the	Eurosceptic	Freedom	Party	is	polling
strongly	and	its	presidential	candidate	Norbert	Hofer	performed	very	well	in	the	2016	election	being
defeated	in	a	re-run	second	round	run-off.	The	Eurozone	crisis	and	the	migration	crisis	both	had	the	effect
of	crystallising	the	Freedom	Party’s	Euroscepticism	but	also,	because	of	the	direct	impacts	of	both	crises	on
Austria	(with	a	relatively	large	intake	of	migrants),	also	appeared	to	move	the	centrist	Social	Democrats	and
Christian	Democrats	to	adopt	a	more	critical	tone	towards	the	EU.	Brexit	had	an	initial	effect	of	bringing
‘Oxit’	into	the	political	lexicon	but	all	parties	have	since	moved	to	a	position	of	clarifying	their	support	for	EU
membership	in	principle.
Greece	(next	parliamentary	election	before	October	2019)	–	Eurosceptic	parties	can	be	found	on	both	the
radical	left	(SYRIZA	and	Communist	Party)	and	right	(Independent	Greeks,	Golden	Dawn	and,	before	it
started	to	wane,	the	Greek	Orthodox	Rally).	Not	surprisingly	the	Eurozone	crisis	had	a	substantial	impact	on
the	Greek	party	system	and	led	to	major	debates	about,	and	criticisms	of,	the	process	that	led	to	the
country’s	economic	settlement	with	the	EU.	Similarly,	the	migration	issue	led	to	a	particularly	intense	debate
around	accusations	that	the	EU	was	not	felt	to	be	doing	enough	to	help	Greece	and	was	proving	incapable
of	handling	another	crisis.	However,	although	Brexit	has	contributed	to	the	general	sense	of	uncertainty
about	the	future	of	the	EU	and	stimulated	some	debate	about	whether	Greece	should	leave,	it	has	not	had
the	same	impact	as	the	two	earlier	crises.	Over	time,	SYRIZA	has	also	become	somewhat	less	Eurosceptic;
although,	given	that	it	has	been	the	main	governing	party	since	2015,	this	could	be	part	of	what	Nick	Sitter
(writing	about	the	Scandinavian	countries)	has	termed	the	‘government-opposition’	dynamic,	whereby
previously	Eurosceptic	opposition	parties	often	become	more	pro-EU	when	they	enter	office	and	vice	versa.
Less	impact	than	expected?
There	are	also	two	cases	where	the	impact	of	the	Brexit	crisis	was	not,	or	does	not	appear	to	have	been,	as
significant	as	some	commentators	expected:
The	Netherlands	–	given	the	previous	electoral	successes	of	radical	right	Eurosceptic	Freedom	Party	of
Geert	Wilders,	there	was	considerable	interest	in	how	the	Brexit	crisis	would	play	out	in	this	country,
particularly	during	the	recent	March	2017	parliamentary	election.	Earlier,	the	Eurozone	crisis	had	some
impact	with	the	Freedom	Party	attempting	to	use	it	to	bolster	its	arguments	about	sovereignty,	while	the
radical	left	(Soft	Eurosceptic)	Socialist	Party	also	objected	to	the	costs	of	the	bailout.	The	Freedom	Party
also	used	the	migration	crisis	to	call	for	a	closing	of	the	Dutch	borders.	However,	although	the	party
originally	lauded	the	UK’s	‘independence	day’,	Brexit	barely	featured	as	one	of	the	themes	in	the	Freedom
Party’s	election	campaign	when,	although	it	slightly	increased	its	share	of	the	vote	and	remained	the	main
opposition	grouping,	the	party	performed	below	some	commentators	expectations.
Germany	(parliamentary	election	in	September	2017)	–	the	Eurozone	crisis	was	essential	to	the	emergence
and	initial	electoral	success	of	the	radical	right	Eurosceptic	Alternative	for	Germany	–	and	also	re-inforced
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the	Euroscepticism	of	the	radical	Left	Party.	However,	while	the	migration	crisis	shifted	the	Alternative	for
Germany’s	policy	focus,	this	came	out	more	as	anti-immigration	than	Eurosceptic	and	the	party	did	little	to
tie	these	two	issues	together.	Moreover,	although	both	the	Alternative	for	Germany	and	Left	Party	used	the
Brexit	vote	to	legitimate	their	existing	opposition	to	the	EU,	it	has	had	little	salience	so	far	and	certainly	not
provided	either	party	with	a	boost	in	the	run-up	to	September’s	federal	election.
Competing	narratives	and	British	exceptionalism?
However,	when	considering	the	impact	of	Brexit	it	is	also	important	to	distinguish	the	short-term	and	long-term	–
and	the	dynamic	effects	of	one	of	the	largest	member	states	leaving	the	EU	on	the	organisation,	both	in	terms	of
perceptions	and	the	reality	of	how	it	operates	(or	even	survives)	in	the	future.	Put	simply:	it	is	too	early	to	tell	what
these	might	be.	On	the	one	hand,	if	the	Brexit	process	is	a	relatively	smooth	one	and	Britain	is,	or	appears	to	be,
successful	outside	the	EU	bloc	there	is	a	possibility	that	it	could	be	used	as	a	model	for	other	Eurosceptic	parties
who	could	then	shift	to	adopting	a	(Hard)	Eurosceptic	stance.	One	the	other	hand,	if	it	is	not	a	success,	or	not
perceived	to	be	one,	this	could	discourage	Soft	Eurosceptic	parties	from	adopting	a	Hard	Eurosceptic	stance,	and
all	kinds	of	Eurosceptics	(especially	Hard	ones)	from	articulating	their	position	(as	appears	to	be	happening	in
Ireland	at	the	moment).
However,	there	are	two	reasons	why	even	then	the	perceived	‘success’	or	‘failure’	of	Brexit	may	not	lead	to	a
long-term	changes	in	the	levels,	nature	and	salience	party	Euroscepticism.	Firstly,	unless	developments	are
completely	unambiguous	(which	is	unlikely)	the	question	of	whether	or	not	Brexit	is	a	‘success’	or	‘failure’	is	likely
to	be	highly	contested,	with	any	subsequent	developments	filtered	and	interpreted	through	the	different	narratives
of	Euroenthusiasts	and	Eurosceptics	respectively.	Second,	even	if	the	outcome	is	seen	as	more	clear-cut,
questions	will	still	be	raised	about	British	exceptionalism	and	whether	broader	lessons	can	really	be	drawn	from
the	British	case;	this	is	particularly	likely	to	be	the	case	if	Brexit	is	a	‘success’.
A	version	of	this	article	first	appeared	at	EPERN	/	EUROPP.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the
position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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are	Co-Convenors	of	the	European	Parties	Elections	and	Referendums	Network	(EPERN),	co-editors	of
Opposing	Europe:	The	Comparative	Party	Politics	of	Euroscepticism	(Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	and	are
currently	running	a	project	on	‘The	Impact	of	the	UK’s	Referendum	on	Euroscepticism	in	Europe’	supported	by
ESRC	‘UK	in	Changing	Europe’	programme.
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